Abstract-We have used various manual abstraction techniques to formally verify a transaction ordering property for an IO protocol over bus/bridge networks. In the context of network protocol verification, an abstraction is needed to reduce the unbounded number of network configurations to a small number of representative networks that can be checked using algorithmic methods. The manually derived abstraction was both brittle and difficult to validate. In this report, we discuss the need for abstraction techniques in the formal verification of protocols over networks and present our recent efforts to create an automatic abstraction technique for network protocols using predicate abstraction as a starting point.
We address the problem of abstraction in the formal verification of safety properties at the bus/bridge level for protocols defined over acyclic branching networks. Abstraction is needed in this context because formal methods applied directly to protocols over networks are either not applicable, or at best difficult and time-consuming. The main source of difficulty is the unbounded nature of branching networks. Because there are an unbounded number of configurations that must be checked, tt is not possible to apply algorithmic methods, such as model checking, to all possible network configurations. We have found [MHJGOO] that it is prohibitively difficult to apply interactive theorem proving in the context of protocols on branching networks.
In this report, we discuss our recent efforts to increase the amount of automation available for creating and reasoning about abstractions of protocols defined over branching networks. The problem with manually derived abstractions is that they need to be validated. Validating an abstraction is the process of showing which properties are preserved by the abstract model. We have found [JGOO] that building a validation proof for a manually derived abstraction for protocols over networks is also difficult.
The significance of this work is that it will provide a technique for creating abstractions of protocols over branching networks such that certain properties of the protocol can be checked with minimal manual effort. The novel feature of this work is a predicate abstraction technique suitable for use on protocols which are defined over networks in which the states and connectivity of intermediate nodes affect the property being checked.
We begin by reviewing relevant results from predicate abstraction and parameterized system verification. Section I1 contains a detailed presentation of the abstraction scheme. The formal presentation in section I1 is closely patterned after the presentation in [GS97] . Section 111 gives an example, and we close with our thoughts on abstractions for networks in the final section.
I. RELATED WORK
The ideas presented here are an extension of predicate abstraction as described in [GS97] . Predicate abstraction is a form of abstraction in which the reduction is constructed manually but the validation and checking tasks are automated. To create a predicate abstraction, the user specifies a set of predicates which are used to divide the abstract state space depending on the truth , or falsity, of the predicates. Given the predicates, an abstract transition relation is constructed such that the original infinite state model is a refinement of the abstract finite state model. In practice, predicate abstraction requires several rounds of verification in which the user adds invariants to eliminate false negatives between rounds. The PVS theorem prover contains support for predicate abstraction and invariant strengthening [SS99] . Predicate abstraction has been applied to limited forms of networks [LS97] in which the particular shape of the network is unimportant to the property being verified. A form of predicate abstraction using BDDs to represent sets of reachable states has been implemented using the Murd, model checker [DDP99] . It is difficult to apply predicate abstraction to parameterized systems due to the quantification required to describe arrays of processes. Quantification makes predicate abstraction difficult because determining if a transition is enabled for a state description containing quantification is either undecidable or requires a complex decision procedure. We address the quantification problem by introducing a second variable for each predicate that encodes whether or not a node exists in the array that satisfies the predicate.
The proposed abstraction scheme applies to branching parameterized systems. [BJNTOO] , [PSOO] for recent results), the early papers consider extensions to include reasoning about branching topologies. Despite the ability of regular expression representations to describe and reason about branching topologies, no results for complex protocols have yet appeared in the literature. By using a different representation and abstraction scheme over a limited class of properties, we hope to derive an abstraction scheme that can be applied to larger examples such as commercial multi-bus IO protocols. The added restriction in our work is that we consider only safety properties defined over a constant number of terminal nodes rather than safety properties in general.
PREDICATE ABSTRACTION FOR NETWORKS
The idea behind the abstraction scheme is project the subnetwork containing the terminal nodes in the property being checked then model the state of each network segment using a variant of predicate abstraction. The variant of predicate abstraction uses an additional boolean variable for each predicate to indicate whether or not a node exists which satisfies the predicate represented by the state variable. The additional existence variable is used to encode quantification which is required to model parameterized systems using predicate abstraction. In the remainder of this section we formally define the model of computation and abstraction scheme. The next section contains an example of the abstraction scheme applied to a trivial property on a simplified version of the PCI protocol A network of processes is created by instantiating a parameterized finite state protocol p a at each node. -4 routing The first three elements of a network, N , A, R, define the global network structure. N and A define the interior and exterior nodes of the network while R defines the connections between exterior nodes using paths of interior nodes.
The latter three elements, X , T , 13, define the state and transition relation of the network in a per-process fashion. 
In the definition of SR, QR is a graph node representing a global network state, P R represents the transitions enabled for a graph node and I R is the set of initial states. The entire state graph, S , for a protocol defined over a network of processes is created by taking the union of all state graphs over all routing tables. For networks with unboundedly large network topologies, S contains a finite but unbounded number of states. Since the unboundedness of S stems from the unbounded number of unique valid routing tables, the crux of the abstraction is creating a model which contains a bounded number of network topologies and using predicate abstraction to model the unbounded number of states in each topology. Each topology has an unbounded number of states because there may be an unbounded number of nodes in each edge of a given network We now define the abstraction of a state graph given the abstraction of a routing table. This part of the abstraction uses predicate abstraction to represent the unbounded number of states in a topology. The abstraction of routing tables will be discussed later. We begin with preliminary definitions and results for predicate transformers. path(n) ( q A ) ) Post [T,"l(?'(qA) 
Intuitively, 5' 2' is an abstraction of S R if for every transition at every node in S R , the strongest postcondition of the concrete states in 'y(qA) is a subset of the concrete states in 'y (,i,p"th'n'(qA) described by a conjunction of quantified predicates as given in Figure 1 . As shown in the figure, an abstract monomial represents the set of concrete states which contain sequences of nodes that may contain a node that satisfies a predicates ( P, depending on the values of i$i and I9; in the monomial. We now define the abstract transition relations parameterized by paths using monomials over abstract state variables. For a given abstract state 7F1 we compute the abstract transition ?," corresponding to transition 7," for some n E IC using the equation shown in Figure 2 . The As mentioned before, the crux of the abstraction is reducing the potentially unbounded number of routing tables over an unbounded set of terminal and non-terminal nodes to a bounded number of small abstract routing tables that 
TUTORIAL EXAMPLE
We give a simple example of checking a property on a simplified version of the PCI protocol [PC195], called PCI,, including only posted messages. In PCI, a posted message is an unacknowledged message which can be neither deleted nor reordered. The property we wish to check is: "if two agents send a posted message to a single destination, then one of the messages always reaches the destination first." The property is not true for PCI, so we expect to find a violation.
There is only one topologically unique way to connect three nodes in an acyclic network, so there is only one abstract routing table to consider in the construction of the abstract state graph. Although all networks over three terminal nodes have the same abstraction, we provide an example of constructing the abstract routing table. Suppose we have a PCI, network containing three terminal nodes with the following routing table:
.i i " (m) = We chose to mark nodes 1,2 and 3 as the terminal nodes in the property being checked; that means that node 10 will be eliminated in the abstraction. After eliminating terminal node 10, we replace the nodes in each non-branching sub-path in the remaining network with a single path. For example, all paths to and from node 1 include nodes 4 and 5 . This means that nodes 4 and 5 form a non-branching sub-path, which we represent as path A in the abstract routing (1,3) from node a to the next node on the path from i to agent 3-if the queue in the next node is not full. Similarly, transition r: moves message (2,3) to the next node on the path from i to agent 3. empty for every other j , k.
The property we want to check asserts that the message from agent 1 to agent 3 arrives at agent 3 first. This is property is expressed by the following predicate:
We use cpb and the additional predicates
to define the abstract state space. Given the initial state 11 and the predicates yb, cp;, 9 ; we have the following initial abstract state: We compute the next states for f1 under the transitions 7-i and r;. We begin with .i;'. First, we check y(f1) + Vn E A.lgF that the concretization of the abstract initial state does not satisfy g r for every node n in ?(A). We check the negated form of the previous equation: Predicate abstraction is conservative, rather than exact, so this violation does not necessarily imply that a violation exists in the concrete model. However, in this case, the violation can be translated into a violating trace. The violating PCI, trace allows the message (2,3) to reach agent 3 before the message (1,3) .
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By restricting the class of properties that can be checked and using a representation based on predicate abstraction, we have created an abstraction method which is intended to extend parameterized system verification to complex protocols over branching networks. At present, our predicate abstraction technique for networks exists only as "paperware." That is, predicate abstraction for networks has been worked out on paper and pencil, and paper examples have been completed; but that we have not yet built a tool which incorporates these techniques and applies them systematically.
Before building a tool based on these ideas, we plan to extend the paper-ware version to include other network classes, apply to distributed shared memory systems and provide conservative support for reasoning about VCTL* properties. We anticipate that the most difficult aspect of the implementation will be providing reasoning support for deciding if the set of concrete states represented by a monomial transition [AK86] [BJNTOO]
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